Opting Out: Biometric Information Privacy and Standing by Jackson, Michelle
OPTING OUT: BIOMETRIC INFORMATION 
PRIVACY AND STANDING 
MICHELLE JACKSON† 
ABSTRACT 
Biometric technology promises to reshape the modern 
economy. With the increased prevalence of biometric technology 
comes a heightened risk of data breaches and identity theft.  To 
protect consumers, state legislatures have enacted biometric 
privacy laws.  As more state legislatures define the intangible 
harm of data misuse, some federal courts have restricted what 
constitutes an injury sufficient to create Article III standing.  
This analysis misapplies Spokeo and undermines legislative 
efforts to protect individual privacy. Because of the important 
interests at stake with biometric information privacy, federal 
courts should follow the Ninth Circuit and recognize the misuse 
of that data as a sufficient injury to constitute standing.  
Consumers usually cannot opt out of new biometric technologies 
implemented at airport gates, shopping centers, and workplaces. 
The federal courts also should not use standing doctrines to opt 
out of the intangible harms characterizing the information age. 
INTRODUCTION 
Your face is now your boarding pass.1 JetBlue used this slogan 
to announce its first fully integrated self-boarding gate, which uses facial 
recognition technology to verify travelers’ identities.2 This technology 
operates in conjunction with a partnership with U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection.3  To verify a traveler’s identity, the technology scans the 
traveler’s face and checks the image against a database maintained by the 
Department of Homeland Security.4  The database cross-references these 
                                                
† J.D. Candidate 2020, Duke University School of Law. 
1 Your Face is Your Boarding Pass, JETBLUE (Nov. 15, 2018), 
http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-relations/press-releases/2018/11-15-
2018-184045420. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Kate Patrick, Facial Recognition Tech Goes Mainstream: Now Airlines, 
Retailers Spy On You, Too, INSIDESOURCES (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.insidesources.com/facial-recognition-tech-goes-mainstream-now-
airlines-retailers-spy-on-you-too/. 
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images with photos from visa and passport applications, allowing 
Customs and Border Patrol to record the passenger’s departure to 
determine if they overstayed their visa.5  The Department of Homeland 
Security aims to use facial recognition technology to identify 97 percent 
of all departing air passengers within the next four years.6  It is unclear 
how airline travelers can opt out of this collection method.7 
Consumers likely cannot opt out of the coming biometric 
technology revolution, either. Businesses already routinely use 
fingerprints and facial recognition technology for surveillance, 
marketing, timekeeping, and tracking customers.8  The market for 
biometric technology is projected to reach nearly $52 billion by 2023.9  
With the vast expansion of biometric technology comes an increased risk 
of data breaches and identity theft.  The risk of identity theft is 
particularly dangerous for biometric identifiers,10 which are completely 
unique to the individual.11  Once they are compromised, “the individual 
has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to 
withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.”12 
                                                
5 Emily Birnbaum, DHS Wants to Use Facial Recognition on 97 Percent of 
Departing Air Passengers by 2023, THE HILL (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/439481-dhs-wants-to-use-facial-
recognition-on-97-percent-of-departing-air. 
6 Id. 
7 See generally Jason Kelley, Skip the Surveillance by Opting Out of Face 
Recognition at Airports, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/skip-surveillance-opting-out-face-
recognition-airports. 
8 See, e.g., Chad Brooks, The Biometric Time and Attendance System Laws You 
Should Know, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY (June 10, 2019) (“Many of today's time 
and attendance systems offer the options of recording employee time by 
fingerprint, palm, iris or facial scan.”); Kiely Kuligowski, Facial Recognition 
Advertising: The New Way to Target Ads at Consumers, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY 
(July 18, 2019) (using facial recognition technology to change product displays 
based on customers); Jennifer Lynch & Adam Schwartz, Victory! Illinois 
Supreme Court Protects Biometric Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/victory-
illinois-supreme-court-protects-biometric-privacy. 
9 Chris Burt, Biometrics Market to Approach $52 billion by 2023 as Facial 
Recognition and Banking AI Expand, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201904/biometrics-market-to-approach-52-
billion-by-2023-as-facial-recognition-and-banking-ai-expand. 
10 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c) (2008) 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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To protect consumers, states are considering laws regulating the 
collection of biometric data.13  One of the earliest and strongest versions 
of these statutes is the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act 
(BIPA), which regulates “the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, 
storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and 
information.”14  The act requires companies to obtain affirmative consent 
before collecting biometric information.15  To enforce these provisions, 
the Act includes a private right of action.16  Lawsuits filed under this 
private right of action will likely increase, especially after the Supreme 
Court of Illinois reduced the threshold required to bring a suit under 
BIPA.17  Some law firms have established practice groups devoted to 
biometric privacy.18  As biometric technology becomes more prevalent 
and more states pass statutes defining these rights, these trends will 
continue to surge.19 
The misuse of biometric information threatens individual privacy 
rights.  As facial recognition technology becomes ubiquitous and more 
companies collect and disseminate biometric information, the stakes of 
these injuries increase exponentially.  In response to this growing threat, 
state legislatures have passed statutes protecting biometric information 
privacy.  At the same time, the standing doctrine has restricted what 
privacy violations constitute concrete harms sufficient for Article III 
standing.  This analysis misapplies Spokeo, allows federal judges to 
substitute their judgment over the judgment of state legislatures, and 
undermines the effectiveness of state legislative responses to growing 
threats to individual privacy.  Section II of this Note provides 
background on the standing doctrine and demonstrates how federal 
courts have used Spokeo to restrict cognizable information privacy 
harms.  Section III details the state statutes protecting biometric 
                                                
13 See, e.g., Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, June 2019: The Rise of 
Biometrics Laws and Litigation, JD SUPRA (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/june-2019-the-rise-of-biometrics-laws-
82168/. 
14 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(e) (2008) 
15 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2008) 
16 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008) 
17 Stephen Mayhew, Law Firms Establish Biometric Privacy Practice Groups to 
Focus on BIPA Claims, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201903/law-firms-establish-biometric-
privacy-practice-groups-to-focus-on-bipa-claims. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. (stating that Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, and New York City are considering 
biometric data privacy legislation). 
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information and the underlying interests at stake and proposes how 
federal courts should analyze the harm caused by threats to biometric 
information privacy. 
ANALYSIS 
I. SPOKEO, STANDING, AND BIOMETRIC PRIVACY 
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the 
United States only to cases and controversies.20  To ensure that federal 
courts remain within this limited grant of authority, the Supreme Court 
developed the doctrine of standing.21  The doctrine of standing “limits 
the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court 
to seek redress for a legal wrong.”22  
The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires 
three elements.23  The plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that 
can be traced to the defendant’s actions and will likely be redressed by a 
favorable decision.24  To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show 
that he suffered from “an invasion of a legally protected interest.”25  This 
invasion must be concrete, particularized, and “actual or imminent.”26  It 
cannot be based on a hypothetical injury.27  An injury is particularized if 
it affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.28 
The injury in fact must also be concrete.29  This requirement 
helps to ensure that the court makes decisions based on “concrete, living 
contest[s] between adversaries,” not abstract, intellectual hypotheticals.30  
                                                
20 U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2. 
21 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, as revised (May 24, 
2016). See also Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The 
law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, 
serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the 
political branches.”). 
22 Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. 
23 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
24 Id. at 560–61. 
25 Id. at 560. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, as revised (May 24, 
2016). 
29 Id. 
30 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (quoting Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
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The injury must be real, not abstract.31  Intangible injuries, however, may 
still be considered concrete for the purposes of standing analysis.32  In 
determining whether an intangible harm qualifies for standing, courts 
should take into account history and Congressional judgment.33  A court 
is more likely to recognize an intangible harm closely related to a 
traditional common law harm.34  The court should also consider 
Congressional judgment “because Congress is well positioned to identify 
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements.”35  
Congress can elevate injuries to the statute of legally cognizable concrete 
injuries.36  This also applies to state legislative judgments.37 
In some instances, the violation of a procedural right created by 
statute is enough to constitute a concrete injury.38  For example, in 
Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the inability to obtain information 
that should have been publicly disclosed under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act constituted an injury in fact.39  The federal statute 
expressly authorized people to file a complaint to challenge violations of 
the act.40  In light of this provision, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Congress intended to authorize suits challenging these violations.41  
Thus, the plaintiffs’ inability to obtain information about campaign 
                                                
31 Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
32 Id. at 1549. (“‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with 
‘tangible.’”). 
33 Id. 
34 See id. (“Because the doctrine of standing derives from the case-or-
controversy requirement, and because that requirement in turn is grounded in 
historical practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible 
harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as 
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”). 
35 Id. 
36 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 
37 See Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the 
importance of federal congressional judgments and reasoning that “the same 
must also be true of legal rights growing out of state law”) (quoting FMC Corp. 
v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981, 993 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
38 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549, as revised (May 24, 
2016) (“Just as the common law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of 
a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to 
constitute injury in fact.”). 
39 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784 (1998) (“The 
injury of which respondents complain––their failure to obtain relevant 
information––is injury of the kind that FECA seeks to address.”).  
40 See id. at 1783 (explaining that Congress has “specifically provided” that 
anyone who believes FECA has been violated may file a complaint).    
41 Id. 
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donors and contributions constituted a concrete and particular injury.42  
Central to this inquiry was the importance of the interest at stake—
voting.43  
The requirement of a concrete injury is not automatically 
satisfied, however, whenever a statute provides a right and authorizes 
someone to sue for the vindication of that right.44  In another 
informational injury case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the publication of inaccurate information in violation 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act constituted a concrete injury in fact.45  
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court held that “Article III standing requires a 
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”46  The Court 
noted that “Congress plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false 
information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk.”47  
Because the Ninth Circuit did not address whether the violations entailed 
“a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement,” 
however, the Court remanded the case.48  
On remand, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the injuries 
were sufficiently concrete for Article III standing.49  An earlier decision 
from the Second Circuit interpreted Spokeo as instructing “that an 
alleged procedural violation can by itself manifest concrete injury where 
Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete 
interests and where the procedural violation presents ‘a risk of real harm’ 
to that concrete interest.”50 The Ninth Circuit adopted this test in Spokeo 
II, asking “(1) whether the statutory provisions at issue were established 
to protect his concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights), 
and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this 
                                                
42 See id. at 1784 (“Given the language of the statute and the nature of injury, we 
conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as respondents from 
suffering the kind of injury at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit.”).  
43 See id. at 1786. (“The informational injury here, directly related to voting, the 
most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete. . . .”). 
44 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, as revised (May 
24, 2016) (discussing the standard for establishing the concreteness and 
particularization of an injury).  
45 Id. at 1544.  
46 Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1045 (2019) (quoting Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 
1549). 
47 Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
48 Id. 
49 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 931, 200 L. Ed. 2d 204 (2018). 
50 Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190 (quoting Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 
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case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such 
interests.”51 
Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress 
established the Fair Credit Reporting Act to protect consumers’ concrete 
interests.52  These interests include protecting consumers from the 
transmission of inaccurate information and protecting consumer 
privacy.53  Because of the “ubiquity and importance of consumer reports 
in modern life,” false information in these reports can constitute a real 
harm to consumers.54  Congress likely intended to protect against this 
threat without showing additional injury, especially because a consumer 
would likely have difficulty determining exactly who accessed the credit 
report.55  The Ninth Circuit also analogized the interests protected by the 
FRCA to other common law reputational and privacy interests, such as 
defamation and libel.56  Because of these historical analogs and evidence 
of Congress’s judgment to protect consumers, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the FRCA protected a concrete interest in accurate credit 
reporting.57 
To satisfy the second part of the test for when a procedural 
violation constitutes a concrete injury, the violation must also cause real 
harm or present a material risk of harm.58  Spokeo II tasked lower courts 
with examining specific violations to determine whether they raise a real 
risk of harm to the concrete injuries the statute protects.59  The Supreme 
Court did not articulate exactly what qualified as real harm for inaccurate 
information but explained that it must be something more than an 
inaccurate zip code.60  The Ninth Circuit found the inaccurate 
information disseminated about the plaintiff regarding his age, 
educational background, and employment history were likely to harm his 
                                                
51 Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1113. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1114. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1115. 
58 Id.  
59 See id. at 1116 (explaining that Spokeo II “requires some examination of the 
nature of the specific alleged reporting inaccuracies to ensure that they raise a 
risk of harm to the concrete interests the FCRA protects”).  
60 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550, as revised (May 
24, 2016) (noting that a “violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural 
requirements may result in no harm”).  
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 300 
 
material interests.61  Thus, the plaintiff alleged injuries sufficiently 
concrete for Article III standing.62 
Federal courts have used the test articulated in Spokeo to dismiss 
a wide range of data privacy lawsuits,63 including cases alleging 
violations of biometric privacy laws.64  In McGinnis v. U.S. Cold 
Storage, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois held 
that failure to provide statutorily required notice when collecting and 
retaining the plaintiff’s fingerprint did not constitute a concrete injury 
requisite for Article III standing.65  The plaintiff did not allege anything 
more than a violation of the requirement in Biometric Information 
Privacy Act of giving notice and obtaining consent before collecting his 
fingerprint.66  He did not allege disclosure to a third party or a data 
breach or even the risk of disclosure.67  He simply alleged that he was 
required to scan his fingerprint for authentication as part of U.S. Cold 
Storage’s time tracking system.68  The court concluded that mere anxiety 
about indefinite retention of his biometric information was insufficient to 
establish a concrete injury for standing.69  
Courts have stringently applied the analysis in Spokeo to dismiss 
cases for lack of standing in information privacy cases.70  Generally, 
courts hesitate to recognize data-breach harms as an injury-in-fact for 
Article III standing.71  This continues to be true with misuse of biometric 
                                                
61 Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1117. 
62 Id. at 1118. 
63 See, e.g., Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 911−12 (7th Cir. 
2017) (finding unlawful retention of customer data insufficient to justify 
standing); Braitberg v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 
2016) (finding unlawful retention of customer data insufficient to justify 
standing). 
64 See, e.g., Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App'x 12 (2d 
Cir. 2017); Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
65 McGinnis v. United States Cold Storage, Inc., 382 F.Supp.3d 813, 819 (N.D. 
Ill. 2019). 
66 Id. at 818. 
67 Id. at 819. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 820. 
70 See Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 
439, 455 (2017) (noting that “lower courts have continued to scrutinize the 
harms claimed by plaintiffs and to reject at least some privacy harms as 
insufficiently ‘concrete’ to support standing”).  
71 See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of 
Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 785 (2018) (“Looking across the 
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information privacy.  As state legislatures continue expanding what 
constitutes biometric information harms, the federal courts are 
counteracting these efforts by restricting the harms that qualify as 
sufficiently concrete injuries.72  In Spokeo, the Supreme Court suggested 
that lower courts look to history and Congressional judgment in 
determining whether injuries are sufficiently concrete.73  Because Spokeo 
provided little guidance on what harms represent a real and material risk, 
however, lower courts have relied on their own judgment to determine 
what harms are sufficient.74  This allows them to substitute their 
judgment for that of the state legislators and undermines the 
effectiveness of new biometric information privacy laws.75 
II. PROTECTING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY 
As biometric technology becomes more ubiquitous, state 
legislatures are seeking solutions to protect biometric information 
privacy.  Some states are modeling these statutes after the Illinois’ 
Biometric Privacy Act, which was passed in 2008.  The Biometric 
Information Privacy Act regulates “the collection, use, safeguarding, 
handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and 
information.”76  A biometric identifier includes “a retina or iris scan, 
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”77  Biometric 
information encompasses any information “based on an individual’s 
biometric identifier used to identify an individual.”78  Significantly, the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act requires companies to obtain 
affirmative consent from consumers before obtaining biometric data.79  
                                                                                                         
body of jurisprudence of data-breach harms, it is fair to say that courts are 
reluctant to recognize data-breach harms.”). 
72 Wu, supra note 70, at 455. 
73 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550, as revised (May 24, 
2016). 
74 See Wu, supra note 70, at 455−57 (“[L]ower courts have continued to 
scrutinize the harms claimed by plaintiffs and to reject at least some privacy 
harms as insufficiently ‘concrete’ to support standing.”). 
75 See Wu, supra note 70, at 456 (“Such a judgment about what ‘counts’ as a 
privacy violation is precisely the sort of judgment that the Supreme Court's pre-
Spokeo cases avoided but that the Spokeo decision invites.”). 
76 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/5(g) (2008).  
77 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/10 (2008). 
78 Id. 
79 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/15(d)(1). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 302 
 
The Act also created a right of action for parties to recover from entities 
that violated the regulations on handling biometric data.80 
 The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the Act in Rosenbach v. 
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation.81  The court explained that the Act 
gives individuals the right to control their biometric information.82  The 
procedural protections are important because “technology now permits 
the wholesale collection and storage of an individual’s unique biometric 
identifiers – identifiers that cannot be changed if compromised or 
misused.”83 A company’s failure to obtain consent before collecting 
biometric data constitutes an independent harm.84  The right of the 
individual to control his or her “biometric privacy vanishes into thin air,” 
and the harm is complete at the moment of the violation.85  
 The court explained that the procedural protection in the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act is not a mere technicality.86  It is the 
statute’s primary precautionary measure to protect biometric privacy.87  
Biometric technology is still in its infancy, and businesses do not have 
mechanisms to remedy these data breaches.88  The legislature intended 
that the Act deter businesses from allowing biometric data breaches.89  
Furthermore, the only enforcement mechanism for this Act is the private 
right of action.90  The court explained that requiring individuals “to wait 
until they have sustained some compensable injury beyond violation of 
their statutory rights before they may seek recourse . . . would be 
completely antithetical to the Act’s preventative and deterrent 
purposes.”91   Thus, the court concluded that a plaintiff does not need to 
allege injury beyond the violation of the rights protected by the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act.92 
                                                
80 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/20. 
81 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1201–02, (Ill. 2019). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (quoting Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 
2018)). 
84 Id.  
85 Id. (quoting Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 
2018)). 
86 Id. at *7. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. at *8. 
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Rosenbach was decided about a month after the federal district 
court came to the opposite conclusion in McGinnis.  Applying Spokeo, 
violations of the notice-and-consent provisions of the Biometric 
Information Privacy Act should “by itself manifest concrete injury.”93  
The state legislature conferred a procedural right to protect consumer’s 
concrete interests, and the violation of that procedural right presents a 
risk of real harm to that interest.94  Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme 
Court reiterated that the violation of this procedural right constituted an 
independent harm to the consumer’s ability to control his or her 
biometric information privacy.95  This harm goes far beyond the 
hypothetical incorrect zip code the Supreme Court mentioned in Spokeo.   
Zip codes can be altered. Biometric information cannot.  Once biometric 
information is misused, a consumer has no recourse.  The violation of 
this intangible harm constitutes an injury in fact. 
How federal courts will interpret the Illinois Biometric 
Information Privacy Act in light of Rosenbach remains unclear.  After 
Rosenbach, the Seventh Circuit upheld standing for an alleged violation 
of the Biometric Information Privacy Act in Miller v. Southwest 
Airlines.96  In Miller, plaintiffs alleged that the airlines use of fingerprints 
for timekeeping purposes violated the Biometric Information Privacy 
Act.97  The potential impact on the workers’ terms and conditions of 
employment gave the case a concrete injury not present in Spokeo.98  The 
Seventh Circuit has not yet decided a case with similar facts as 
Rosenbach.99  In past decisions not involving the Biometric Information 
Privacy Act, the Seventh Circuit has held that retaining personal 
information did not constitute a concrete injury.100  
How federal courts respond to future standing challenges 
involving biometric information privacy will determine the effectiveness 
of state legislative attempts to protect biometric information.  Federal 
                                                
93 See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018). 
94 Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1559, as revised (May 24, 2016)). 
95 Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1197, 1201–02. 
96 Miller v. Sw. Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2019). 
97 Id. at 901. 
98 Id. at 902. 
99 The court may have an opportunity to hear a case with similar facts with the 
appeal from Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(dismissing for lack of standing). 
100 Rivera, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (citing Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 
846 F.3d 909, 912–13 (7th Cir. 2017)). 
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judges may have concerns about the impending flood of litigation 
accompanying these statutes or whether the notice-and-consent 
provisions are appropriate remedies for violations of biometric 
information privacy.  They should not use standing doctrines, however, 
to supersede the judgments of state legislatures.101 The rapid proliferation 
of facial recognition technology requires a quick, informed response by 
state legislatures.  Allowing courts to scrutinize which privacy harms are 
cognizable and which are not “undermines the legislature’s ability to act 
to prevent harms proactively.”102  For now, private enforcement is the 
primacy mechanism to prevent violations of biometric information 
privacy.103  Denying relief by characterizing a privacy harm as the wrong 
kind of harm impedes this enforcement mechanism.104  
Rather than deepening the split between federal and state courts 
and between the federal circuits, federal courts should follow the lead of 
the Ninth Circuit.  In Patel v. Facebook, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Facebook’s collection of the plaintiffs’ face templates constituted a 
concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing.105  The court explained 
that the right protected by the Biometric Information Privacy Act was the 
right to not be subject to the collection of biometric data.106  Thus, 
Facebook’s violation of the procedural requirements under BIPA 
violated the plaintiffs’ substantive privacy interests.107  Quoting 
Rosenbach, the court explained that “when a private entity fails to adhere 
to the statutory procedures . . . the right of the individual to maintain his 
                                                
101 See Wu, supra note 70, at 458 (“When courts deny standing in these cases on 
the basis of the injuries being insufficiently concrete, they are not deciding 
whether the cases are ones that concern individual rights, but rather deciding the 
substantive content of those rights. Far from supporting an appropriate 
separation of powers, this move amounts to a usurpation of legislative power by 
the federal judiciary.”). 
102 See id. at 459 (“Moreover, scrutiny of harms undermines the legislature's 
ability to act to prevent harms proactively, rather than only addressing 
completed harms.”). 
103 See id. at 460 (“Denying standing on the basis of the harm being the wrong 
kind of harm essentially takes private lawsuits in federal courts out of the picture 
entirely. While the possibility of purely executive or administrative action would 
remain, such a rule can severely hamper the government's ability to regulate the 
challenged activity by removing an important tool from the regulatory 
toolbox.”). 
104 Id. at 460. 
105 Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019). 
106 Id. at 1274. 
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or her biometric privacy vanishes into thin air.”108  To prevent 
protections of biometric privacy from vanishing, federal courts should 
recognize the substantive rights of privacy protected by statutes like the 
Biometric Information Privacy Act.  
CONCLUSION 
Biometric technology promises to reshape modern commerce, 
transportation, law enforcement, and more. The greatest injuries will 
likely be intangible and based on ephemeral interests in information 
privacy.109  As state legislatures attempt to define these intangible harms, 
the federal courts should not use standing to opt out of providing 
remedies. 
 
                                                
108 Id. (quoting Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1201–02 
(Ill. 2019)). 
109 See Seth F. Kreimer, "Spooky Action at A Distance": Intangible Injury in 
Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2016). 
